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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge, joined by McKEE, Chief Judge, and 
SLOVITER, SCIRICA, RENDELL, AMBRO, FUENTES, 
SMITH, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
William Garrus (“Garrus”), a Pennsylvania state 
prisoner, seeks federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 
as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).  Garrus was found guilty in 
state court of voluntary manslaughter in 2001.  At sentencing, 
the judge increased his sentence beyond the statutory 
maximum based on 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9714, Pennsylvania‟s 
“three strikes” law.  In order to do so, the judge made a 
judicial finding that Garrus had previously been convicted of 
burglarizing an occupied building, when, in fact, he had only 
pled guilty to, and been convicted of, second degree burglary 
(which, under Pennsylvania law, necessarily requires that the 
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burglarized building was unoccupied).  In the habeas petition 
now before us, Garrus argues that this judicial factfinding 
violated the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, requiring that 
“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).  The 
District Court denied the petition on the basis that the highest 
state court determination upholding Garrus‟s sentence was 
not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly 
established Federal law. 
Key to our determination is a single question:  
whether, pursuant to AEDPA, the state court unreasonably 
applied Apprendi by allowing Garrus to be sentenced beyond 
the statutory maximum based on a judicial finding that Garrus 
burglarized an occupied building, despite his plea to the 
contrary.
1
  For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the 
state court determination upholding Garrus‟s sentence was 
objectively unreasonable, and that Garrus is entitled to habeas 
relief.  Accordingly, we will reverse the order of the District 
Court. 
                                              
1
 We agree with Judge Hardiman that the order for 
rehearing en banc misstated the issue.  Dissenting Op. of 
Hardiman, J. at Part I; Order at 1-2, Garrus v. Secretary of the 
Pa. Dep’t of Corr., No. 09-3586 (3d. Cir. Feb. 24, 2012).  
Nonetheless, the parties have briefed and argued, and we now 
analyze, the proper question in this case, which is stated 
above. 
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I. 
On February 10, 2000, Garrus was at the home of his 
girlfriend, Toi Bryant, with whom he has a daughter, when 
Bryant‟s ex-boyfriend, Charles Goode, showed up at the 
residence.  Shortly after Goode arrived, an argument ensued 
between him and Bryant involving their child.  As the 
argument escalated, Garrus took his daughter upstairs.  He 
later returned downstairs to the kitchen where Goode and 
Bryant were arguing.  After Garrus and Goode exchanged 
some heated words, a fight broke out between the two men.  
Garrus picked up a kitchen knife and stabbed Goode several 
times in the chest area.  Goode broke away from Garrus and 
ran upstairs to the bathroom.  Garrus left the home.  When 
police arrived, both Goode and Bryant identified Garrus as 
the attacker.  Goode later died from his injuries. 
Following a jury trial in the Philadelphia County Court 
of Common Pleas, Garrus was convicted on March 9, 2001, 
of voluntary manslaughter and possession of an instrument of 
crime.  A conviction for voluntary manslaughter carries a 
maximum sentence of 20 years of imprisonment.  18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. §§ 1103, 2503(c).  However, the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania (the “Commonwealth”) notified the trial 
court that it would seek a sentencing enhancement under 
Pennsylvania‟s “three strikes” law, which requires a judge to 
sentence a defendant to a minimum term of 25 years‟ 
imprisonment (and a maximum of up to life imprisonment) if 
the defendant was previously convicted of two or more 
separate “crimes of violence.”  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9714.  
“Crimes of violence” may include first degree burglary 
(defined as, inter alia, burglary of an occupied structure), but 
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do not include second degree burglary (defined as, inter alia, 
burglary of an unoccupied structure).
2
 
On April 30, 2001, the trial court held the first of two 
sentencing hearings.  The Commonwealth offered evidence 
                                              
2 A burglary is only a “crime of violence” when it is 
“burglary of a structure adapted for overnight accommodation 
in which at the time of the offense any person is present[.]”  
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9714.  Under Pennsylvania law, second-
degree and first-degree burglary are mutually exclusive.  
Second-degree burglary is burglary that occurs where the 
structure “is not adapted for overnight accommodation and 
. . . no individual is present at the time of entry[.]”  18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 3502(c)(2).  First-degree burglary, on the other 
hand, occurs where the structure is adapted for overnight 
accommodation, or if an individual is present at the time of 
entry.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3502.  By definition, then, first-
degree burglary that includes both factors (structure adapted 
for overnight accommodation and an individual present) is a 
“crime of violence,” but second-degree burglary is not a 
“crime of violence.”  See Commonwealth v. Ausberry, 891 
A.2d 752, 756 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (“[T]he definition of 
a crime of violence . . . corresponds to the definition of first 
degree burglary as set forth in section 3502(c)(1) and 
3502(c)(2).” (quoting Commonwealth v. Guilford, 861 A.2d 
365, 375 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004))); Guilford, 861 A.2d at 375 
(“[T]he section 9714(g) definition of burglary as a crime of 
violence corresponds to the definition of burglary as a first 
degree felony,” and thus, second-degree burglary “is not a 
crime of violence pursuant to section 9714(g).”). 
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that Garrus had three prior convictions for “crimes of 
violence:”  (1) a January 1995 conviction for first-degree 
robbery; (2) a February 1995 conviction for first-degree 
robbery; and (3) a February 1997 plea and conviction for 
second-degree burglary.  The Commonwealth argued that 
although Garrus had only pled guilty to second degree 
burglary in 1997, the trial court should consider a police 
report and witness statements regarding that burglary to find 
instead that the building Garrus had burglarized in 1997 was 
occupied.  On the basis of the police report and witness 
statements, the trial court found at the second sentencing 
hearing on May 8, 2001, that Garrus‟s prior 1997 conviction 
for second-degree burglary constituted a crime of violence 
under § 9714.  Commonwealth v. Garrus, June Term 2000 
No. 0092, slip op. at 17 (Phila. Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 16, 
2002).  Additionally, it found that the two 1995 robberies 
constituted two separate crimes of violence, and that his 
conviction for voluntary manslaughter was his fourth crime of 
violence.  Id.  The trial court sentenced Garrus to a term of 25 
to 50 years‟ imprisonment.  Id. 
Garrus appealed his conviction and sentence to the 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
3
  He argued that, by 
definition, his 1997 second-degree burglary conviction did 
not constitute a “crime of violence” under Pennsylvania‟s 
“three strikes” law.  The Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
                                              
3 On appeal in this Court, Garrus challenges only his 
sentence under Pennsylvania‟s “three strikes” law.  
Accordingly, we refer solely to the prior resolution of this 
claim. 
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adopted the trial court‟s opinion in its entirety.  
Commonwealth v. Garrus, No. 2592 EDA 2001 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. Oct. 18, 2002).  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
granted Garrus‟s petition seeking allocatur on the sole issue 
of Garrus‟s sentence, Commonwealth v. Garrus, 817 A.2d 
455 (Pa. 2003), but later dismissed the appeal in September 
2003 as having been improvidently granted.  Commonwealth 
v. Garrus, 832 A.2d 1063 (Pa. 2003). 
In April 2004, Garrus filed a pro se petition for post-
conviction relief in the Philadelphia County Court of 
Common Pleas, pursuant to Pennsylvania‟s Post Conviction 
Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541 et seq., 
challenging his sentence.  He argued that the trial court, at 
sentencing, violated his constitutional rights, as articulated in 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476, by relying on the police report and 
victim statement to determine that his 1997 burglary 
conviction was a “crime of violence” under Pennsylvania‟s 
“three strikes” law.  Garrus also asserted that state law 
required his two 1995 robbery convictions to be considered as 
one “crime of violence” under the “three strikes” law.  As a 
result, Garrus claimed that he had, at most, one prior 
conviction for a “crime of violence,” rendering him ineligible 
for the 25-year mandatory minimum sentence he had 
received. 
Garrus‟s PCRA petition was dismissed in February 
2005.  A month later, the Supreme Court rendered a decision 
in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005), in which the 
Court held that a sentencing court is not permitted to consider 
police reports in determining whether a prior conviction 
constituted a “violent crime” under the Armed Career 
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Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924, a federal 
recidivism statute.  Id. at 16, 26. 
On appeal from the denial of his PCRA petition, 
Garrus argued that the sentencing court‟s consideration of the 
police report and victim statement, with respect to his 1997 
burglary conviction, violated his rights under Apprendi and 
Shepard, and he again argued that his two 1995 robbery 
convictions constituted one “crime of violence.”  The 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the denial of his 
PCRA petition.  Commonwealth v. Garrus, No. 961 EDA 
2005 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 2006).  In its opinion, the 
Superior Court acknowledged that Apprendi requires that 
“any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the 
maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an 
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 8-9 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 
476).  However, it determined that the prior conviction 
exception permitted the sentencing judge to find that Garrus 
had burglarized an occupied building despite his plea to the 
contrary, and to sentence him beyond the statutory maximum 
accordingly.  The Superior Court also determined that the 
Supreme Court‟s decision in Shepard did not affect the 
validity of the prior conviction exception established in 
Apprendi.  Finally, on the basis that the 1997 burglary 
constituted a “crime of violence,” the Superior Court declined 
to reach the issue of whether the two 1995 robberies 
constituted separate crimes.  The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania denied Garrus‟s petition seeking further 
appellate review.  Commonwealth v. Garrus, 906 A.2d 639 
(Pa. Aug. 29, 2006) (table). 
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On January 16, 2007, Garrus filed a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254.  Garrus raised the same challenges to both his 1997 
burglary conviction and the two 1995 robbery convictions.  
The Magistrate Judge denied Garrus‟s petition, Garrus v. 
Mazurkiewicz, No. 07-187 (E.D. Pa. May 28, 2008), and 
concluded that it was precluded from granting federal habeas 
relief because the sentencing court‟s consideration of the 
police report and victim statement in determining whether 
Garrus had two prior convictions for crimes of violence under 
Pennsylvania‟s “three strikes” law was not contrary to, or an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme 
Court precedent.  Id. at 38-39. 
The Magistrate Judge also concluded that Garrus‟s 
argument that his two 1995 robbery convictions should be 
considered as one for purposes of the recidivism statute was 
therefore moot, as Garrus still had at least two prior 
convictions for crimes of violence – the 1997 burglary 
conviction and at least one of the 1995 robbery convictions.  
In any event, the Magistrate Judge reasoned, Garrus‟s 
challenge to the 1995 robbery convictions involved an 
interpretation of state law and could not be considered by 
federal courts in a habeas petition. 
Nevertheless, the Magistrate Judge recommended that 
the District Court issue a certificate of appealability to this 
Court, limited to the issue involving the 1997 burglary 
conviction.  The District Court adopted the Magistrate 
Judge‟s recommendation, with the exception that it rejected 
the Magistrate Judge‟s determination that sufficient grounds 
 11 
existed to issue a certificate of appealability.  Garrus v. 
Johnson, No. 07-187 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2009).  Garrus 
appealed, and on March 12, 2010, we granted a certificate of 
appealability to consider the issue of whether the state 
sentencing court violated Garrus‟s constitutional rights by 
labeling the 1997 second-degree burglary conviction a “crime 
of violence” for purposes of applying Pennsylvania‟s “three 
strikes” law. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction to consider 
Garrus‟s habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as the 
claim raised in the petition has been properly exhausted in the 
state courts.  See Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1242 (3d 
Cir. 1994).
4
  We have jurisdiction to review the District 
                                              
4 Our review of Garrus‟s claim is not barred by the 
adequate and independent state ground doctrine.  See Harris 
v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989).  In its PCRA opinion, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that Garrus might have 
“three strikes” against him even without counting the 
burglary charge as a “crime of violence,” but it failed to 
clearly decide the issue, relying instead on the finding that the 
burglary charge comprised one of the three necessary strikes.  
Commonwealth v. Garrus, No. 961 EDA 2005, slip op. at 10-
11 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 2006).  That opinion was the last 
state court decision on the merits, see Greene v. Fisher, 132 
S. Ct. 38, 43-45 (2011), and because it did not “clearly 
express[] . . . reliance on an adequate and independent state-
law ground, we may address [the] federal issue considered by 
the state court.”  Harris, 489 U.S. at 263. 
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Court‟s judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  
We exercise de novo review over a District Court‟s denial of 
habeas relief, Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d 
Cir. 2007), and apply the highly deferential AEDPA standard, 
which, in this case, precludes us from granting habeas relief 
unless the challenged state court decision was “contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
Federal law[.]”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
III. 
 Core to a criminal defendant‟s constitutional rights is 
the principle that “criminal convictions [must] rest upon a 
jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every 
element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 
510 (1995); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).  
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that this same right 
applies to a sentencing factor that would increase a 
defendant‟s sentence beyond the statutory maximum because, 
like an element of a separate crime, such a sentencing factor 
results in a higher sentence than that which could be 
prescribed for the original crime.  530 U.S. at 476, 490.  
Thus, there is no “principled basis” for treating such a 
sentencing factor differently than an element of a crime.  Id. 
at 476.  The exception is that a judge can increase the 
sentence beyond the statutory maximum based on “the fact of 
a prior conviction” because a prior conviction has already 
been established through procedural safeguards.  Id. at 488-
90; Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999) (“[A] 
prior conviction must itself have been established through 
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procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and 
jury trial guarantees.”). 
 These precepts are “rooted in longstanding common-
law practice[.]”  Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 
281 (2007).  Apprendi recounted their historical context, 
noting that early on in our history, judges had “very little 
explicit discretion in sentencing.”  530 U.S. at 479.  Any 
“circumstances mandating a particular punishment” had to be 
charged to the jury in the indictment; there was “[no] 
distinction between an „element‟ of a felony offense and a 
„sentencing factor[.]‟”  Id. at 478, 480.  In the 19th century, 
this idea began to shift, “from statutes providing fixed-term 
sentences to those providing judges discretion within a 
permissible range[.]”  Id. at 481.  Crucially, this shift “has 
been regularly accompanied by the qualification that [such 
judicial] discretion was bound by the range of sentencing 
options prescribed by the legislature.”  Id. 
 By the late 20th century, the Supreme Court began to 
address state laws that increased a defendant‟s punishment 
based on factors found at sentencing, rather than based on 
factors found at trial.  In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 
79 (1986), the Supreme Court, “for the first time, coined the 
term „sentencing factor‟ to refer to a fact that was not found 
by a jury but that could affect the sentence imposed by the 
judge.”  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485 (construing McMillan).  
Consistent with longstanding constitutional principles, 
McMillan held that a “sentencing factor” must at times be 
found by a jury because “(1) constitutional limits exist to 
States‟ authority to define away facts necessary to constitute a 
criminal offense, and (2) . . . a state scheme that keeps from 
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the jury facts that „expos[e] [defendants] to greater or 
additional punishment,‟ may raise serious constitutional 
concern[s].”  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 486 (quoting McMillan, 
477 U.S. at 85-88) (internal citations omitted). 
 A decade later, the Supreme Court decided 
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 242-47 
(1998), a case in which the defendant was convicted for his 
presence in the United States after being deported, a violation 
which normally carried a maximum of two years‟ 
imprisonment.  523 U.S. at 227.  Prior to his initial 
deportation, Almendarez-Torres was convicted of three 
aggravated felonies, and according to the sentencing statute, 
where the original deportation had occurred subsequent to an 
aggravated felony, the court could impose a maximum 
sentence of up to twenty years‟ imprisonment.  Id. at 227, 
229.  Almendarez-Torres argued that he could not be subject 
to more than two years‟ imprisonment, because his indictment 
had not mentioned his earlier aggravated felony convictions.  
Id. at 227.  Importantly, there was no contention that the 
defendant had not been convicted of the three aggravated 
felonies, but only that the fact of his prior convictions should 
have been included in the indictment and charged to the jury.  
Id.  Thus, Almendarez-Torres had earlier been convicted of 
the facts necessary for the sentencing enhancement, “pursuant 
to proceedings with substantial procedural safeguards of their 
own[.]”  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488.  In other words, by 
judicially finding that Almendarez-Torres‟s three prior 
convictions existed, the sentencing judge did not “change a 
pre-existing definition of a well-established crime, nor . . . 
„evade‟ the Constitution, either by „presuming‟ guilt or 
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„restructuring‟ the elements of an offense.”  Almendarez-
Torres, 523 U.S. at 246. 
 The Supreme Court found that the fact of Almendarez-
Torres‟s prior convictions did not have to be charged to the 
jury because the constitutional limitations articulated in 
McMillan did not apply.
5
  Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 
228, 242-43.  As the Supreme Court later explained in 
Apprendi:  “[b]oth the certainty that procedural safeguards 
attached to any „fact‟ of prior conviction, and the reality that 
Almendarez-Torres did not challenge the accuracy of that 
„fact‟ in his case, mitigated the due process and Sixth 
Amendment concerns otherwise implicated in allowing a 
judge to determine a „fact‟ increasing punishment beyond the 
maximum of the statutory range.”  530 U.S. at 488. 
 A year after Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme Court 
explained that Almendarez-Torres‟s recidivism exception was 
permitted because “a prior conviction must itself have been 
established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, 
reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.”  Jones, 526 U.S. 
at 249.  In Jones, the trial court gave the defendant a sentence 
beyond the statutory maximum based on a judicial finding 
                                              
5
 Judge Greenaway asserts that the Almendarez-Torres 
rule “remains . . . amorphous and undefined[.]”  Dissenting 
Op. of Greenaway, J. at Part III.  However, as explained 
above, even in Almendarez-Torres itself, the Supreme Court 
did not allow carte blanche factfinding related to recidivism.  
523 U.S. at 242-46.  Thus, the holding of Almendarez-Torres 
has never been as broad as Judge Greenaway suggests. 
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that the carjacking offense he was convicted of involved 
“serious bodily injury.”  Id. at 230-31.  The Supreme Court 
found that the carjacking statute required a jury, rather than a 
judge, to determine whether the crime involved “serious 
bodily injury,” citing “grave” constitutional questions that 
would arise if the statute were to be interpreted otherwise.  Id. 
at 231, 239.  Although Jones did not actually reach the 
constitutional issue, its explanation of Almendarez-Torres and 
its constitutional discussion were significant, especially given 
that Apprendi explicitly “confirm[ed] the opinion . . . 
expressed in Jones[,]” 530 U.S. at 490, that “under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and 
jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other 
than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for 
a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, 
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  530 U.S. at 476 
(quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6). 
 Against this historical backdrop, the Supreme Court 
decided Apprendi, where a defendant pled guilty to unlawful 
possession of a weapon, a second-degree offense punishable 
by up to ten years‟ imprisonment.  Despite the defendant‟s 
plea and conviction for a second-degree offense, the trial 
court sentenced him to twelve years‟ imprisonment, a 
“punishment identical to that . . . provide[d] for crimes of the 
first degree,” based on a judicial finding pursuant to a New 
Jersey hate crime sentencing enhancement, “that the 
defendant‟s „purpose‟ for unlawfully possessing the weapon 
was „to intimidate‟ his victim on the basis of a particular 
characteristic the victim possessed.”  530 U.S. at 468-69, 471, 
491.  The Apprendi Court began by stating that “[a]t stake in 
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this case are constitutional protections of surpassing 
importance: the proscription of any deprivation of liberty 
without „due process of law,‟ Amdt. 14, and the guarantee 
that „[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury[.]‟”  
530 U.S. at 476-77.  It then discussed several centuries of 
precedent, summarizing that a criminal defendant may not be 
“expose[d] . . . to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would 
receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury 
verdict alone.”  Id. at 482-83. 
 Apprendi explained that Almendarez-Torres was “at 
best an exceptional departure from . . . historic practice” and a 
“limited” and “narrow” exception based on “unique facts[.]”  
Id. at 487, 488 n.14, 489-90.  Twice in its opinion, the 
Apprendi Court emphasized that Almendarez-Torres was 
different because “Almendarez-Torres had admitted the three 
earlier convictions for aggravated felonies[,]” and those prior 
convictions “had been entered pursuant to proceedings with 
substantial procedural safeguards of their own[.]”  Id. at 488; 
see also id. (reiterating the same points).  Thus, “no question 
concerning the right to a jury trial or the standard of proof 
that would apply to a contested issue of fact was before the 
Court.”  Id. 
Having explained the historical principles and the 
Almendarez-Torres exception, the Apprendi Court 
summarized the law as follows, in the now-famous Apprendi 
rule: 
“[O]ur reexamination of our cases in this area, 
and of the history upon which they rely, 
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confirms the opinion that we expressed in 
Jones. Other than the fact of a prior conviction, 
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must 
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. With that exception, we 
endorse the statement of the rule set forth in the 
concurring opinions in that case: „[I]t is 
unconstitutional for a legislature to remove 
from the jury the assessment of facts that 
increase the prescribed range of penalties to 
which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is 
equally clear that such facts must be established 
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.‟” 
Id. at 490 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 252-53 (Stevens, J., 
concurring); citing id. at 253 (Scalia, J., concurring)).  
Applying this newly articulated rule, the Apprendi court ruled 
that it was unconstitutional for the sentencing judge to 
increase Apprendi‟s sentence beyond the statutory maximum 
based on a judicial finding that the crime to which Apprendi 
pled guilty constituted a hate crime.  In doing so, it compared 
Almendarez-Torres, reiterating that:  “there is a vast 
difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment 
of conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant 
had the right to a jury trial and the right to require the 
prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
allowing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser 
standard of proof.”  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496. 
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IV. 
 Based on these constitutional principles, Garrus 
requests habeas relief under AEDPA.  Specifically, he claims 
that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment and Due 
Process rights by finding that his prior 1997 conviction 
constituted a “crime of violence” and argues that the state 
appellate court decisions affirming that finding were 
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States” in Apprendi.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
 AEDPA “„imposes a highly deferential standard for 
evaluating state-court rulings‟ and „demands that state-court 
decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.‟”  Felkner v. 
Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 1305, 1307 (2011) (quoting Renico v. 
Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010)).  We must use habeas 
corpus as a “„guard against extreme malfunctions in the state 
criminal justice systems,‟ not a substitute for ordinary error 
correction through appeal.”  Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 
770, 786 (2011).  Thus, we may grant habeas relief under 
AEDPA only if the state court‟s adjudication of a claim 
“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[,]” 
or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
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determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 
the State court proceeding.”6  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
 Because the state court identified and relied on the 
correct governing legal rule established by Apprendi, we must 
apply AEDPA‟s “unreasonable application” standard.7  See 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-08 (2000).  Under 
AEDPA‟s “unreasonable application” standard, we “may not 
issue the writ [if we merely] conclude[] . . . that the relevant 
state-court decision applied clearly established federal law 
erroneously or incorrectly.”  Id. at 411.  “Rather, that 
application must be „objectively unreasonable.‟”  Renico, 130 
S. Ct. at 1862 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409).  In other 
                                              
6
 Judge Hardiman computes the frequent rate at which 
the Supreme Court has reversed habeas decisions of the 
Courts of Appeals based on failure to afford appropriate 
deference to state court judgments.  Dissenting Op. of 
Hardiman, J. at Part I.  Such statistics cannot dispose of the 
instant case, especially in light of the Supreme Court‟s recent 
reminder that “[j]udges must be vigilant and independent in 
reviewing petitions for the writ[.]”  Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 
780 (emphasis added). 
7 We consider the last state court adjudication on the 
merits, Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 44-45, which was the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court‟s PCRA decision, found at 
Commonwealth v. Garrus, No. 961 EDA 2005 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
Apr. 18, 2006).  See Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 43-45 
(Pennsylvania Supreme Court‟s denial of petition for appeal 
is not considered an adjudication on the merits). 
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words, we must consider whether the state court‟s 
“determination can[] be reconciled with any reasonable 
application of the controlling standard[.]”  Panetti v. 
Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (emphasis added).  
Garrus must show that “the state court‟s ruling . . . was so 
lacking in justification that there was an error well understood 
and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 
fairminded disagreement.”  Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87. 
 This case turns on the meaning of the “unreasonable 
application” standard.  Garrus argues that the state court 
unreasonably applied Apprendi and its prior conviction 
exception by permitting the trial court to determine at 
sentencing that Garrus‟s prior 1997 conviction for 
burglarizing an unoccupied building (second-degree burglary) 
actually involved burglarizing an occupied building.  In 
response, the Commonwealth argues that Garrus cannot meet 
his burden of proving that the state court‟s application of 
Apprendi was objectively unreasonable because neither 
Apprendi nor any case since has explicitly defined the scope 
of “the fact of a prior conviction” exception.  However, our 
determination is not dependent on a fully delineated 
interpretation or application of “the fact of a prior conviction” 
exception, only a reasonable one.  Panetti, 551 U.S. at 953 
(“That the standard is stated in general terms does not mean 
the application was reasonable.”).  The AEDPA standard is 
not so “myopic” nor “constrained” that it requires the full 
scope of all clearly established laws to be precisely defined.  
Jamison v. Klem, 544 F.3d 266, 273 (3d Cir. 2008); see also 
id. (noting that if a Supreme Court decision must precisely 
resolve a given issue under AEDPA, only the “contrary to” 
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standard would exist, and the “unreasonable application” 
standard would be rendered meaningless).  Rather, AEDPA 
requires that if a clearly established rule or principle is stated, 
however general, state courts must adhere to a reasonable 
application of that rule.
8
  Panetti, 551 U.S. at 953. 
                                              
8
 Our dissenting colleagues appear to agree that the 
focus of our inquiry should be on the “unreasonable 
application” prong of AEDPA.  Dissenting Op. of 
Greenaway, J. at Part I; Dissenting Op. of Hardiman, J. at 
Part I.  Judge Greenaway also concedes that “Apprendi is at 
the forefront of our inquiry,” and that Apprendi limited and 
narrowed Almendarez-Torres.  Dissenting Op. of Greenaway, 
J. at Part II.  At the same time, Judges Greenaway and 
Hardiman fault us for not identifying a case “expounding on 
the contours of the amorphous prior-conviction exception.”  
Id. at ¶ 2; Dissenting Op. of Hardiman, J. at Part I. 
AEDPA, however, does not require clearly established 
federal law to be further elucidated by additional precedent 
before an application of that law may be unreasonable.  See 
Panetti, 551 U.S. at 953 (“AEDPA does not „require state and 
federal courts to wait for some nearly identical factual pattern 
before a legal rule must be applied.‟” (quoting Carey v. 
Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 81 (2006))).  Instead, under AEDPA, 
“even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable 
manner.”  Id. (citing Williams, 529 U.S. 362).  Thus, our task 
is to review the Pennsylvania Superior Court‟s application of 
Apprendi, the clearly established federal law we do have, to 
Garrus‟s claim. 
 23 
 Apprendi clearly requires that any fact “other than the 
fact of a prior conviction” must be submitted to a jury if it 
will increase the penalty beyond the statutory maximum.  530 
U.S. at 490.  Under AEDPA there is undoubtedly a broad 
spectrum of reasonable applications of this rule, but a fact that 
actually defies and contradicts a prior conviction falls 
squarely outside the spectrum of reasonable interpretations.  
Cf. Wilson v. Knowles, 638 F.3d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(“Courts may reasonably disagree about some of the precise 
boundaries of the exception. . . .  But that does not mean that 
Apprendi is amorphous. . . .  The judge‟s fact-finding seven 
years after the 1993 conviction extended beyond any 
reasonable interpretation of the prior conviction exception.”).  
We can find no reasonable basis for applying Apprendi to 
allow judicial finding of a fact that is inconsistent with and 
contradicts the facts established through constitutional 
procedures.  The very reason for the exception is to recognize 
facts that have already “been established through procedures 
satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial 
guarantees.”  Jones, 526 U.S. at 249.  The phrase “fact of a 
                                                                                                     
By contrast, the rationale of our dissenting colleagues 
would render the Apprendi rule meaningless.  It would, in 
effect, shift this case to the “contrary to” prong of AEDPA, 
preserving the “unreasonable application” prong of AEDPA 
in name only.  Such an analysis is particularly inappropriate 
here because the Pennsylvania Superior Court correctly 
“identified controlling Supreme Court precedent.”  Dissenting 
Op. of Greenaway, J. at Part I (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 
406). 
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prior conviction” might be reasonably construed to allow 
judicial factfinding of a fact underlying a prior conviction or a 
fact consistent with a prior conviction.  However, absent case 
law authorizing some type of paradoxical interpretation, “fact 
of a prior conviction” cannot reasonably be interpreted to 
allow judicial factfinding of a fact contradicting a prior 
conviction or a fact inconsistent with a prior conviction.
9
 
                                              
9
 Judge Greenaway faults our opinion for an alleged 
internal inconsistency:  we rely on Apprendi, a case 
concerned with the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, to 
require the sentencing judge to determine that Garrus‟s prior 
conviction was not a crime of violence.  Dissenting Op. of 
Greenaway, J. at Part III.  But Apprendi does not prohibit a 
judge from finding facts that do not increase a sentence 
beyond the statutory maximum.  Rather, Apprendi only 
prohibits judicial factfinding that increases a sentence beyond 
the statutory maximum.  530 U.S. at 490. 
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 No existing precedent so much as hints that a 
paradoxical interpretation of Apprendi might be reasonable.
10
  
Thus, under Apprendi, it was objectively unreasonable for the 
state court to allow Garrus to be sentenced beyond the 
statutory maximum based on a mere allegation that actually 
defied and contradicted his prior conviction.  The 
Commonwealth proffers several cases, which it argues could 
have supported the state court‟s decision to apply the prior 
conviction exception in Garrus‟s case, but its attempts fall 
flat. 
 Despite the Commonwealth‟s attempts to paint it as 
such, Almendarez-Torres is not a panacea allowing 
recidivism-related judicial factfinding, or supporting the state 
court‟s determination that Apprendi‟s prior conviction 
exception permitted the sentencing judge to find that Garrus 
had burglarized an occupied building despite his plea to the 
contrary.  Apprendi cited Almendarez-Torres as the “limited” 
                                              
10
 Judge Greenaway counters that “no Supreme Court 
precedent suggests that the majority‟s interpretation is the 
only reasonable interpretation.”  Dissenting Op. of 
Greenaway, J. at Part III.  This argument implies that Judge 
Greenaway would defer to an objectively unreasonable state 
court judgment as long as there were more than one possible 
reasonable application of a Supreme Court precedent.  While 
AEDPA mandates a highly deferential standard, it does not 
go as far as Judge Greenaway suggests.  Instead, the test is 
whether the state court judgment “can[] be reconciled with 
any reasonable application of the controlling standard[.]”  
Panetti, 551 U.S. at 953. 
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and “narrow” exception to the Apprendi rule, 530 U.S. at 488 
n.14, 489-90, and explained that the constitutionality of that 
exception rested on (1) “the certainty that procedural 
safeguards attached to any „fact‟ of prior conviction,” and 
(2) “the reality that Almendarez-Torres did not challenge the 
accuracy of that „fact‟ in his case[.]”  Id. at 488.  In fact, 
Apprendi emphasized these factors at least twice, and it is 
important to note that neither factor is present in this case.  
Regarding the first factor, the only “fact” judicially found by 
the sentencing court in Almendarez-Torres was the actual fact 
that the defendant was convicted, and that “fact” had 
previously been established through a conviction process 
applying procedural safeguards.  In contrast, Garrus was only 
accused of – not convicted of – the violent crime of 
burglarizing an occupied building (which would have been 
first-degree burglary).  More importantly, Garrus only pled 
guilty and was convicted of burglarizing an unoccupied 
building (second-degree burglary).  Thus, unlike the 
Almendarez-Torres defendant, whose sentence was enhanced 
based on actual prior convictions, Garrus‟s sentence was 
enhanced beyond the statutory maximum without a basis in 
any jury determination or plea admission.  Because the “fact” 
of which Garrus was accused was never found by a jury nor 
was it an element of the crime for which he pled guilty, no 
procedural safeguards attached to the finding of this “fact.” 
 As to the second factor, Garrus makes clear in his 
reply brief that, unlike Almendarez-Torres, he did not 
concede or admit the fact at issue.  In fact, at the sentencing 
hearing, he questioned the judicial finding that his 1997 
conviction was a “crime of violence.”  (Sentencing Hr‟g Tr. 
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28, May 8, 2001, see App. at 177a.)  A defendant waives his 
Apprendi rights only if he “either stipulates to the relevant 
facts or consents to judicial factfinding.”  Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 310 (2004) (citing Apprendi, 530 
U.S. at 488; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968)).  
Thus, neither of the two factors that allowed Almendarez-
Torres to stand as a narrow exception to Apprendi apply in 
this case.  As Apprendi explained, “there is a vast difference 
between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of 
conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had 
the right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor 
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” as occurred in 
Almendarez-Torres, and “allowing the judge to find the 
required fact under a lesser standard of proof[,]” as occurred 
in both Apprendi and here in Garrus‟s case.  See 530 U.S. at 
496.  Therefore, it was objectively unreasonable for the state 
court to find that Almendarez-Torres authorized the 
application of Apprendi‟s prior conviction exception in this 
case. 
 Had Garrus been convicted of first-degree burglary in 
1997 (based on a jury finding or plea establishing that he 
burglarized a building that was occupied and adapted for 
overnight accommodation), we do not doubt that under 
Almendarez-Torres, the court sentencing him for his later 
manslaughter conviction could have taken note of the earlier 
first-degree burglary conviction and held that it qualified as a 
crime of violence under Pennsylvania‟s “three strikes” law.  
However, Garrus was convicted of second-degree burglary. 
 Given the highly deferential AEDPA standard, it is 
even possible that if Pennsylvania merely had a generic 
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burglary statute that did not differentiate between burglarizing 
an occupied or unoccupied building, a reasonable application 
of the “fact of a prior conviction” exception might have 
permitted the judge to look at facts underlying the prior 
burglary conviction to determine whether Garrus was 
convicted of burglarizing an occupied building.
11
  See, e.g., 
United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 153, 157 (2d Cir. 
2001) (finding that Apprendi allows a sentencing judge to 
find “not only the mere fact of previous convictions but 
[certain] other related issues as well”);12 cf. Taylor v. United 
                                              
11 We do not make any determination regarding this 
hypothetical issue; rather, we raise it to highlight the narrow 
scope of the issue before us today. 
12
 The Dissents urge us to follow Santiago.  Dissenting 
Op. of Greenaway, J. at Part III; Dissenting Op. of Hardiman, 
J. at Part II.  There, the issue was whether, under the federal 
recidivism statute, Apprendi required a jury to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant‟s three predicate 
convictions were committed on separate occasions.  Santiago, 
268 F.3d at 152-53.  Then-Judge Sotomayor ruled that 
Apprendi did not prohibit sentencing judges from 
“determin[ing] the „who, what, when, and where‟ of a prior 
conviction.”  Id. at 156.  But the Second Circuit declined to 
extend this exception to the Apprendi rule “to all issues 
related to recidivism[.]”  Id. 
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States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (holding that under a federal 
“three strikes” law, the sentencing judge may only find facts 
that were necessary to the prior conviction).  However, the 
sentencing judge in this case looked at the previous 
conviction for burglarizing an unoccupied building, and 
nonetheless found facts supporting exactly the opposite 
proposition:  that the building had been occupied.  Because 
Garrus was convicted of burglarizing an unoccupied building, 
the finding that the building was occupied was simply not a 
“fact of a prior conviction.”  The finding that the building was 
occupied could be viewed as a fact of a prior accusation of 
first-degree burglary, or as a fact contradicting a prior 
                                                                                                     
Santiago is not controlling here.  As an initial matter, 
Santiago is not “existing precedent” for AEDPA purposes.  
See Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 785 (“Federal habeas relief may 
not be granted for claims subject to [28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)] 
unless it is shown that the earlier state court‟s decision . . . 
involved an unreasonable application” of “federal law then 
clearly established in the holdings of the Supreme Court.”) 
(citations and internal quotations omitted).  More importantly, 
permitting a sentencing judge to determine facts related to the 
“who, what, when, and where” of a prior conviction is 
altogether different from allowing judicial factfinding that 
completely contradicts a prior conviction.  Here, the 
sentencing court found as a “fact” related to Garrus‟s prior 
conviction an allegation that was contained in a police report 
and victim statement and that was irreconcilable with his plea 
agreement.  The Second Circuit‟s reasoning in Santiago 
cannot be stretched to these facts. 
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conviction for second-degree burglary.  Either way, it cannot 
be reasonably interpreted as a “fact of a prior conviction.” 
 We likewise disagree with the Commonwealth‟s 
convoluted argument that Shepard somehow supports the 
state court‟s determination because it was decided on a 
statutory basis rather than a constitutional one.  As a threshold 
matter, we note that Garrus contends that Shepard supports 
him rather than the Commonwealth.  However, because 
Shepard‟s holding was limited to a federal statute that is 
inapplicable here and its constitutional discussion was mere 
dicta, Garrus cannot rely on it for relief.  See Carey, 549 U.S. 
at 74 (“„[C]learly established Federal law‟ in § 2254(d)(1) 
„refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of th[e] 
[Supreme] Court‟s decisions as of the time of the relevant 
state-court decision.‟” (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 412)).13  
Nevertheless, we will address the Commonwealth‟s argument 
that Shepard somehow made the state court‟s application of 
Apprendi reasonable.  Cf. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 643 
and n.2 (2003) (even cases that are not binding might be 
relevant to the consideration of whether a state court decision 
is objectively unreasonable). 
 Shepard involved a sentencing enhancement pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 924, which applies where a defendant has been 
                                              
13  We need not reach the issue of whether Teague‟s 
retroactivity inquiry also precludes Garrus from relying on 
Shepard for relief.  See Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272 
(2002) (noting that Teague‟s retroactivity inquiry remains 
relevant post-AEDPA). 
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previously convicted of violent felonies, including burglaries 
of buildings.  544 U.S. at 15-16.  Shepard had previously 
been convicted of burglary four times, but he was convicted 
of burglarizing structures under Massachusetts law, and thus 
it was unclear from his convictions whether he had 
burglarized buildings or some other types of structures such 
as vehicles.  Id. at 16-17; see also id. at 31 (O‟Connor, J., 
dissenting).  The Supreme Court held, based on principles of 
statutory interpretation, that the sentencing court was not 
permitted to look at police reports in order to determine 
whether the structures the defendant had burglarized were 
buildings.  Id. at 16-22.  It ruled that the sentencing court was 
“limited to the terms of the charging document, the terms of a 
plea agreement or [the terms of the] transcript of [the plea] 
colloquy . . . or to some comparable judicial record of this 
information.”  Id. at 26. 
 The Commonwealth suggests that the state court could 
have gleaned support from Shepard by finding that because 
Shepard‟s holding was not constitutionally based, the use of 
police reports for judicial factfinding was constitutionally 
permissible.  However such non sequitur reasoning is 
objectively unreasonable.  The Shepard Court did nothing 
more than employ the classic doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance by deciding the case on a statutory basis.  It is 
entirely unreasonable to read constitutional avoidance as 
indicative that a practice is constitutionally permissible.  In 
fact, if anything can be read into the Shepard Court‟s 
discussion of the Constitution in dicta, it is that the majority 
of the Court expressed grave constitutional concerns: four 
justices cited concerns that looking at police reports 
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underlying a prior conviction posed “serious risks of 
unconstitutionality” under Apprendi, and Justice Thomas 
would have gone further and found the entire “fact of a prior 
conviction” exception to be unconstitutional.  See id. at 25 
(plurality); id. at 26-28 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 Even assuming for purposes of this analysis that the 
Supreme Court expressed constitutional uncertainty about 
Apprendi‟s application in Shepard, it does not follow that 
Apprendi‟s application here is unclear.  In fact, nothing in 
Shepard supports the Commonwealth‟s argument that “the 
fact of a prior conviction” might be reasonably construed to 
mean a fact contradicting a prior conviction because Shepard 
simply did not involve a fact contradicting a prior conviction.  
Crucially, Shepard had four times been convicted of 
burglarizing structures, and the police reports did not 
contradict this fact.  Rather, the police reports supported the 
conviction for burglary of structures, and merely explained 
specifically that the types of structures involved were 
buildings.  As the plurality noted, the factual allegations in 
the Shepard police reports might have been permitted by 
Apprendi as “a fact about a prior conviction[.]”  Shepard, 544 
U.S. at 25 (plurality) (emphasis added).  The Shepard 
dissent‟s argument also highlights this distinction by stating 
that sentencing judges should be able to refer to “internally 
consistent parts of the record from the earlier conviction.”  Id. 
at 31 (O‟Connor, J., dissenting).  In contrast, the police report 
alleging that Garrus burglarized an occupied building cannot 
reasonably be interpreted as a fact consistent with or a fact 
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about Garrus‟s conviction for burglarizing an unoccupied 
building. 
 Rather than supporting the Commonwealth‟s 
argument, Shepard demonstrates that even judicial factfinding 
that is consistent with a prior conviction might be 
unconstitutional.  By no means does it support the proposition 
that Apprendi‟s “fact of a prior conviction” exception might 
be reasonably interpreted to allow judicial factfinding that 
contradicts a prior conviction. 
 Finally, the Commonwealth strains to argue that some 
Circuit court cases show that the state court‟s application of 
Apprendi was reasonable.  See Kessee v. Mendoza-Powers, 
574 F.3d 675 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Smith, 474 
F.3d 888, 892 (6th Cir. 2007), abrogation on other grounds 
recognized by United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195, 205 
(6th Cir. 2011); Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 
2006); United States v. Hollingsworth, 414 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 
2005); United States v. Williams, 410 F.3d 397 (7th Cir. 
2005); United States v. Camacho-Ibarquen, 410 F.3d 1307 
(11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Kempis-Bonola, 287 F.3d 
699 (8th Cir. 2002); Santiago, 268 F.3d at 151.  We disagree; 
none of these cases demonstrates that it was reasonable for 
the state court to apply Apprendi to sentence a defendant 
beyond the statutory maximum based on a fact contradicting a 
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prior conviction.
14
  In short, none of these cases involves a 
judicial finding of fact that contradicted the defendant‟s prior 
                                              
14
 Contrary to Judge Hardiman‟s argument, there is no 
circuit split on this issue, and our decision here does not 
create one.  Dissenting Op. of Hardiman, J. at Part II.  Neither 
Portalatin v. Graham, 624 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2010), nor United 
States v. Davis, 260 F.3d 965 (8th Cir. 2001), addresses the 
question in this case.  For this reason, we express no view on 
whether these cases were decided correctly, nor do we 
question the fairmindedness of those jurists. 
In Portalatin, the petitioners were sentenced under 
New York‟s recidivism statute.  624 F.3d at 72.  Pursuant to 
that law, a defendant is subject to an increased sentencing 
range as a repeat offender “based solely on whether [he] [has] 
two prior convictions.”  Id. at 88 (quoting People v. Rivera, 
833 N.E.2d 194, 198 (N.Y. 2005) (original emphasis)).  After 
a sentencing court determines that a defendant is a repeat 
offender and that an increased sentencing range applies, it 
considers “the history and character of the defendant, and the 
nature and circumstances of his crime,” before selecting a 
sentence within the increased range.  Id. at 90.  In Portalatin, 
the Second Circuit first agreed with the New York Court of 
Appeals that if the recidivism statute were construed “to 
require the court to find additional facts about the defendant 
before imposing a recidivism sentence, the statute[] would 
violate Apprendi.”  Id. at 89 (quoting Rivera, 833 N.E.2d at 
198) (emphasis added).  But the Portalatin court also 
concluded that a sentencing court could consider subsidiary 
facts about a defendant‟s prior convictions before imposing a 
 35 
                                                                                                     
repeat offender sentence without violating Apprendi.  Id. at 
92.  Nonetheless, the important point here is that the Second 
Circuit did not discuss whether the sentencing court could 
find or consider underlying facts that contradict an offender‟s 
prior conviction.  The failure to address this subject is 
unsurprising as the Portalatin petitioners did not dispute their 
underlying convictions.  Id. at 75-78. 
Similarly, in Davis, the appellant, sentenced as a repeat 
offender under federal law, argued that due process required a 
jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that his prior 
convictions were qualifying felonies under the recidivism 
statute.  260 F.3d at 967-69.  The Eighth Circuit held only 
that, under Apprendi and Almendarez-Torres, the “fact of 
prior conviction includes . . . a determination of whether a 
conviction is one of the enumerated types qualifying for the 
sentence enhancement under [18 U.S.C. § 3559].”  Id. at 969 
(citation omitted).  Conspicuously absent from the Davis 
decision is any indication that the Eighth Circuit would have 
held it reasonable for the state court, in making its 
determination, to find facts precluded by the prior conviction. 
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conviction.
15
  In fact, at least one of the cases did not even 
involve judicial factfinding that increased the penalty beyond 
                                              
15 Only Garrus cites to a case that is close to being on 
point:  Wilson, 638 F.3d 1213.  Wilson was convicted by a 
jury of driving under the influence with a prior felony 
conviction.  Id. at 1214.  At sentencing, the judge found that 
Wilson‟s conviction was his third strike under California‟s 
“three strikes” law, and enhanced his sentence accordingly.  
In order to find that one of the previous convictions counted 
as a strike under California‟s “three strikes” law, the 
sentencing judge had to make several findings of fact that 
were not necessary for the conviction.  Id. at 1215.  The issue 
for the Ninth Circuit was whether such judicial findings “fell 
within the prior conviction exception.”  Id.  The Ninth Circuit 
started by noting that “[c]ourts may reasonably disagree about 
some of the precise boundaries of the exception . . . [b]ut that 
does not mean that Apprendi is amorphous.”  Id.  It went on 
to find that the judicially found facts – such as the extent of 
the victim‟s injuries – were disputed and not found by a jury 
or in any way necessary to the conviction.  Id.  “The judge . . . 
speculated as to how a [previous] jury . . . might have 
evaluated the evidence if the evidence had been offered and if 
a jury had been impaneled to evaluate it.”  Id.  Thus, the 
judge‟s factfinding “extended beyond any reasonable 
interpretation of the prior conviction exception.”  Id. 
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the prescribed statutory maximum.  See Smith, 474 F.3d at 
892. 
 Upon a thorough and circumspect examination of the 
potential arguments or theories that “supported or . . . could 
have supported, the state court‟s decision[,]” we believe that 
no “fair-minded jurist could disagree that those arguments or 
                                                                                                     
Just as in Wilson, Garrus‟s sentencing judge made 
judicial findings of fact that were not necessary to his prior 
conviction, and then speculated as to how a jury might have 
evaluated the evidence had it been offered, or whether Garrus 
might have admitted to the evidence at his plea hearing.  The 
Commonwealth tries to distinguish Wilson on the basis that 
the facts here in Garrus‟s case are “less controversial” than 
the judicially found facts in Wilson, but we find such a 
distinction unavailing; regardless of how controversial the 
facts were in Wilson, the determinative issue was that such 
facts were not necessary to the verdict, and were never 
determined by a jury nor pled to by the defendant.  Id. at 
1215-16.  If anything, Garrus‟s case is stronger than Wilson‟s 
because in Garrus‟s case the facts actually contradicted his 
prior conviction, whereas in Wilson‟s case, the facts were 
simply not necessary to the prior conviction. 
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theories are inconsistent with the holding in” Apprendi.16  
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786; see also Panetti, 551 U.S. at 
953 (The “record . . . cannot, under any reasonable 
interpretation of the controlling legal standard, support [the 
state‟s] legal ruling.”).  In fact, no fairminded jurist could 
disagree that the state court‟s paradoxical interpretation of the 
prior conviction exception renders an absurd result under 
Apprendi, allowing a judge that applies the “three strikes” 
statute to make the very factual finding that an earlier judge 
would have been prohibited from making.  As we noted 
above, Apprendi pled guilty to unlawful possession of a 
weapon, a second-degree offense punishable by a maximum 
of ten years‟ imprisonment, but the judge increased the 
sentence beyond the statutory maximum based on the finding 
of an additional factor, effectively imposing punishment on 
the defendant for a first-degree offense.  Apprendi, 530 U.S. 
                                              
16
 Judge Greenaway accuses us of wasting “pages 
examining Supreme Court precedent” without “grappl[ing] 
with precedent that undermines” our position.  Dissenting Op. 
of Greenaway, J. at Part II.  We agree that it would have been 
simpler for us to prove the reasonableness of our own 
interpretation of Apprendi.  But we recognize that under 
AEDPA, we “must determine what arguments or theories 
supported or . . . could have supported the state court‟s 
decision; and then [we] must ask whether it is possible 
fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or 
theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision 
of [the Supreme] Court.”  Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786.  Our 
analysis comports with this standard. 
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at 491.  Thus, under Apprendi, it is clear that a judge applying 
the initial sentence for second-degree burglary (under 
Pennsylvania law) cannot enhance the sentence beyond the 
statutory maximum based on the finding that the defendant 
burglarized an occupied building, effectively imposing 
punishment on the defendant for a first-degree offense.  The 
Commonwealth today would have us believe that Apprendi 
may be reasonably applied to allow a later judge sentencing a 
defendant to look back at the defendant‟s initial conviction 
and make the factual finding that the initial sentencing judge 
was prohibited from making.  Apprendi cannot be reasonably 
construed or applied to allow this absurd result. 
 Accordingly, we conclude that it was objectively 
unreasonable for the state court to apply Apprendi‟s prior 
conviction exception to allow judicial factfinding based on an 
allegation that actually defied and contradicted the elements 
of the prior conviction.  The rule of Apprendi and the prior 
conviction exception simply cannot be reconciled with the 
state court decision.  In sum, Garrus has shown that “the state 
court‟s ruling . . . was so lacking in justification that there was 
an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 
beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”  
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87. 
 We recognize the rarity of today‟s determination; 
seldom does a state court‟s decision fail to withstand 
AEDPA‟s highly deferential standard.  However, our 
conclusion that the state court unreasonably applied clearly 
established law by relying on a narrow and inapplicable 
exception is not unprecedented.  See Abdul-Kabir v. 
Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 258 (2007) (finding that the state 
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court unreasonably applied clearly established law by relying 
on an inapplicable “narrow holding” and “ignoring the 
fundamental principles established by [the Supreme Court‟s] 
most relevant precedents”); Williams, 529 U.S. at 397 
(finding that the state court unreasonably applied clearly 
established law by relying on an “inapplicable” exception to 
the law clearly established by Strickland).  AEDPA severely 
constrained our ability to review state court decisions, but it 
did not render our review void or meaningless.  See, e.g., 
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (“§ 2254(d) stops short of 
imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of 
claims already rejected in state proceedings.”); Jamison, 544 
F.3d at 273 (the “unreasonable application” standard is not 
meaningless).  We must use our habeas authority only to 
“guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal 
justice systems,” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786, and today, we 
exercise our authority to do so. 
V. 
 We conclude that the District Court erred in 
determining that § 2254(d)(1) prevented it from granting 
Garrus habeas relief.  The state court unreasonably applied 
Apprendi by allowing Garrus to be sentenced beyond the 
statutory maximum based on a judicial finding that he 
burglarized an occupied building when he was actually 
convicted of burglarizing an unoccupied building. 
 Having determined that AEDPA does not bar federal 
habeas relief, we must also consider whether the state court 
determination had a “substantial and injurious effect” on 
Garrus‟s sentence.  Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 116-20 
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(2007); see also Horn, 536 U.S. at 272 (“none of our post-
AEDPA cases have suggested that a writ of habeas corpus 
should automatically issue if a prisoner satisfies the AEDPA 
standard”).  There is no doubt that the state court‟s 
determination relied on its application of Apprendi to uphold 
the trial court‟s decision to increase the length of Garrus‟s 
sentence, and that Garrus has therefore shown a “substantial 
and injurious effect.”  We conclude that the District Court 
erred in failing to grant habeas relief under these 
circumstances.  We will reverse the order of the District 
Court, and remand with directions that a writ of habeas 
corpus be conditionally granted, providing that petitioner be 
resentenced or released from custody within 120 days, unless, 
within that time, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
determines that petitioner qualifies for the sentencing 
enhancement based on his two 1995 robbery convictions. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting, joined by 
CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and VANASKIE, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
 Judge Greenaway has succinctly explained how the 
Court has gone astray in this case, and I join his dissent in its 
entirety.  I write separately because I think the reason why the 
majority has erred illuminates how it has done so. 
I 
 Since its enactment in 1996, no law has so vexed the 
United States Courts of Appeals as the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  In 
twelve years, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in 
ninety-four cases arising under AEDPA, forty-six of which 
involved questions of federal court deference to decisions of 
state courts.1
                                              
 1 See Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148 (2012); 
Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060 (2012); Lafler v. 
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 
1181 (2012); Hardy v. Cross, 132 S. Ct. 490 (2011); Bobby v. 
Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26 (2011); Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2 
(2011); Bobby v. Mitts, 131 S. Ct. 1762 (2011); Cullen v. 
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011); Felkner v. Jackson, 131 
S. Ct. 1305 (2011); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 
(2011); Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733 (2011); Berghuis v. 
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010); Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 
1855 (2010); Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382 (2010); 
Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841 (2010); Smith v. Spisak, 130 
  Thirty-four of those cases (approximately 
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seventy-four percent) have been reversed because the court of 
appeals failed to afford sufficient deference to the state court.2
                                                                                                     
S. Ct. 676 (2010); McDaniel v. Brown, 130 S. Ct. 665 (2010); 
Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447 (2009); Knowles v. 
Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (2009); Waddington v. Sarausad, 
555 U.S. 179 (2009); Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120 
(2008); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007); Fry v. 
Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 (2007); Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 
(2007); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007); Brewer v. 
Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286 (2007); Abdul-Kabir v. 
Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233 (2007); Carey v. Musladin, 549 
U.S. 70 (2006); Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006); Kane v. 
Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9 (2005); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 
U.S. 374 (2005); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005); 
Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 (2005); Holland v. Jackson, 
542 U.S. 649 (2004); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 
(2004); Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433 (2004); Mitchell 
v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12 (2003); Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 
U.S. 1 (2003); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); 
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); Woodford v. 
Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 
(2002); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002); Ramdass v. 
Angelone, 530 U.S. 156 (2000); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 
362 (2000). 
  
 
 2 See Parker, 132 S. Ct. 2148; Coleman, 132 S. Ct. 
2060; Howes, 132 S. Ct. 1181; Hardy, 132 S. Ct. 490; Dixon, 
132 S. Ct. 26; Cavazos, 132 S. Ct. 2; Mitts, 131 S. Ct. 1762; 
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388; Felkner, 131 S. Ct. 1305; 
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. 770; Premo, 131 S. Ct. 733; 
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250; Renico, 130 S. Ct. 1855; Smith, 
130 S. Ct. 1382; Spisak, 130 S. Ct. 676; McDaniel, 130 S. Ct. 
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Remarkably, twenty-two of those cases—almost fifty 
percent—were reversed without dissent.3
                                                                                                     
665; Knowles, 556 U.S. 111; Waddington, 555 U.S. 179; 
Wright, 552 U.S. 120; Uttecht, 551 U.S. 1; Schriro, 550 U.S. 
465; Carey, 549 U.S. 70; Rice, 546 U.S. 333; Kane, 546 U.S. 
9; Payton, 544 U.S. 133; Holland, 542 U.S. 649; Yarborough, 
541 U.S. 652; Middleton, 541 U.S. 433; Mitchell, 540 U.S. 
12; Gentry, 540 U.S. 1; Lockyer, 538 U.S. 63; Woodford, 537 
U.S. 19; Early, 537 U.S. 3; Bell, 535 U.S. 685. 
 
 
 3 See Parker, 132 S. Ct. at 2155 (holding that the Sixth 
Circuit erred by following its own precedent rather than that 
of the Supreme Court in determining what is “clearly 
established Federal law”); Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 2062 
(holding that the Third Circuit “failed to afford due respect to 
the role of the jury and the state courts of Pennsylvania”); 
Hardy, 132 S. Ct. at 495 (reversing the Second Circuit and 
stating, “[T]he deferential standard of review set out in 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not permit a federal court to overturn a 
state court’s decision on the question of unavailability merely 
because the federal court identifies additional steps that might 
have been taken.  Under AEDPA, if the state-court decision 
was reasonable, it cannot be disturbed.”); Dixon, 132 S. Ct. at 
27 (“Because it is not clear that the Ohio Supreme Court erred 
at all, much less erred so transparently that no fairminded 
jurist could agree with that court’s decision, the Sixth 
Circuit’s judgment must be reversed.”); Mitts, 131 S. Ct. at 
1765 (holding that the Sixth Circuit erred in finding that the 
state court’s jury instructions were contrary to clearly 
established federal law); Felkner, 131 S. Ct. at 1307 (“The 
state appellate court’s decision was plainly not unreasonable.  
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There was simply no basis for the Ninth Circuit to reach the 
opposite conclusion, particularly in such a dismissive 
manner.”); Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 778 (“[The Ninth 
Circuit’s] opinion shows an improper understanding of 
§ 2254(d)’s unreasonableness standard and operation in the 
context of a Strickland claim.”); Premo, 131 S. Ct. at 746 
(holding that the Ninth Circuit erred in granting habeas relief 
because the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable 
application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984)); Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 1392 (finding that the Sixth 
Circuit erred in granting habeas relief because the state 
court’s decision was consistent with Duren v. Missouri, 439 
U.S. 357 (1979)); Spisak, 130 S. Ct. at 684 (holding that the 
Sixth Circuit erred in granting habeas relief because the state 
court’s upholding of jury instructions and verdict forms 
regarding the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors 
was not “contrary to, or . . . an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law” (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)); McDaniel, 130 S. Ct. at 672 
(holding that the Ninth Circuit erred in granting habeas relief 
because the state court’s rejection of the defendant’s 
insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim was not unreasonable 
under AEDPA); Knowles, 556 U.S. at 114 (finding that the 
Ninth Circuit erred because the state court’s decision that the 
defendant was not deprived of effective counsel was not 
“contrary to, or . . . an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law” (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Wright, 552 U.S. at 126 (reversing the 
Seventh Circuit and stating, “because our cases give no clear 
answer to the question presented, let alone one in [the 
defendant]’s favor, it cannot be said that the state court 
unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law.” 
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(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Carey, 549 
U.S. at 72 (holding that the Ninth Circuit improperly granted 
habeas relief because the state court’s decision that it was not 
inherently prejudicial when court spectators wore buttons 
depicting the murder victim was not contrary to or an 
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law); 
Rice, 546 U.S. at 334 (finding that the Ninth Circuit 
improperly granted habeas relief because it was not 
unreasonable for the state trial court to “credit the 
prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for the [defendant’s] 
Batson challenge”); Kane, 546 U.S. at 10 (holding that the 
Ninth Circuit improperly granted habeas relief because there 
exists no clearly established right under federal law to access 
a law library while in jail); Holland, 542 U.S. at 652 
(concluding that the Sixth Circuit erred because the state 
court’s application of Strickland was not unreasonable under 
AEDPA); Middleton, 541 U.S. at 437–38 (holding that the 
Ninth Circuit erred because the state appellate court’s 
conclusion that one incorrect statement in jury instructions 
did not render the instructions likely to mislead the jury was 
not unreasonable); Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 13 (finding that the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision “ignore[d] the limits imposed on 
federal habeas review by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)”); Gentry, 540 
U.S. at 11 (noting that the Ninth Circuit gave “too little 
deference to the state courts that have primary responsibility 
for supervising defense counsel in state criminal trials”); 
Woodford, 537 U.S. at 20 (holding that the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision “exceed[ed] the limits imposed on federal habeas 
review by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)”); Early, 537 U.S. at 4 
(finding that the state appellate court’s determination that the 
trial court’s comments did not coerce the jury was not 
contrary to clearly established federal law). 
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 The Supreme Court decisions catalogued in the margin 
echo a common mistake: the failure to adhere to AEDPA’s 
extraordinarily deferential standard of review.  Our Court 
makes that same mistake today. 
 The majority’s fundamental error is manifest in the 
question we presented to the parties: “whether the district 
court erred in considering the defendant’s 1997 conviction for 
second-degree burglary in determining whether the defendant 
should be sentenced under Pennsylvania’s ‘three strikes’ law, 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9714.”  This was the wrong question to 
ask in an AEDPA case that originated in state court.  As the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania correctly argued, “[u]nder 
the federal habeas statute, ‘the only question that matters [is] 
whether [the] state court decision is contrary to, or involved 
an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal 
law.’”  Appellee’s Supp. Br. 1 (emphasis added) (quoting 
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003)).  Indeed, “a state 
prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim 
being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification 
that there was an error well understood and comprehended in 
existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 
disagreement.”  Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786–
87 (2011).  Even petitioner Garrus acknowledged—albeit in 
somewhat apologetic fashion—that the question we presented 
invited argument under the wrong legal standard: 
The question presented is somewhat ambiguous 
because the district court did not “consider” the 
1997 burglary conviction for purposes of 
“determining whether the defendant should be 
sentenced under Pennsylvania’s ‘three strikes’ 
law.”  Instead, applying 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), 
the district court analyzed whether the 
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Pennsylvania Superior Court unreasonably 
applied clearly established U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent when it upheld the state sentencing 
court’s decision to rely on police reports and 
witness statements to make findings of fact 
about the 1997 burglary conviction, only to rely 
on those findings to impose an enhanced 
sentence under the Three Strikes Law. 
Appellant’s Br. 1 n.1. 
 Instead of posing a question that circumvented 
AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, we should have 
asked whether any Supreme Court decision directly prohibits 
a state court judge from looking to the facts underlying a 
defendant’s prior conviction when considering a recidivism 
enhancement.  The answer to that question is “no.” 
II 
 Central to the state court’s decision was the issue of 
who—judge or jury—should find facts regarding prior 
convictions when assessing a defendant’s history of 
recidivism.  Because recidivism “‘does not relate to the 
commission of the offense, but goes to the punishment only, 
[it] therefore . . . may be subsequently decided’” by the 
sentencing judge.  Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 
U.S. 224, 244 (1998) (quoting Graham v. West Virginia, 224 
U.S. 616, 629 (1912)).  Garrus did not even attempt to explain 
why his case does not fall squarely within the recidivism 
exception announced in Almendarez-Torres.  Instead, he 
relied entirely on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000).  But as then-Judge Sotomayor wrote for the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a case not subject to 
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AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, “recidivism has 
long been considered a distinct issue,” and “[n]othing in 
Apprendi itself—as it involved a hate crime statute enhancing 
sentences based on the motivation underlying the crime—
calls that distinction into question.”  United States v. 
Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 156 (2d Cir. 2001).  Judge 
Sotomayor then clearly explained why Apprendi is of no help 
to habeas petitioners such as Garrus: 
Almendarez-Torres explains why recidivism 
requires special treatment, and absent an 
explicit Supreme Court ruling to the contrary, 
we decline to institute a policy that runs counter 
to the principles set forth in that opinion. In 
short, we read Apprendi as leaving to the judge 
. . . the task of finding not only the mere fact of 
previous convictions but other related issues as 
well.  Judges frequently must make factual 
determinations for sentencing, so it is hardly 
anomalous to require that they also determine 
the “who, what, when, and where” of a prior 
conviction. 
Id. 
 If this were not a case governed by AEDPA and the 
question presented was whether what befell Garrus violated 
the rule of Apprendi, the majority’s decision might well be 
correct.  It is no secret that Almendarez-Torres is one of the 
most tenuous  precedents of the Supreme Court; three of the 
five sitting justices who participated in Apprendi have openly 
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criticized Almendarez-Torres.4
The existence of a circuit split demonstrates that it is 
wrong to conclude that “‘fairminded jurists could [not] 
disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision” in 
this case.  Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) 
(quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).  
The Courts of Appeals for the Second and Eighth Circuits 
have found no constitutional violation in circumstances 
similar to those presented in this appeal.  See Portalatin v. 
Graham, 624 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2010) (en banc); United States 
v. Davis, 260 F.3d 965 (8th Cir. 2001). 
  Nevertheless, I am convinced 
that even critics of Almendarez-Torres would be hard-pressed 
to hold that the state court in this case violated the rule of 
Apprendi when it found facts pursuant to a state recidivist 
statute. 
 In Portalatin, the Second Circuit consolidated the 
habeas petitions of three prisoners who had been sentenced 
under New York’s persistent felony offender (PFO) statute.  
The petitioners argued that the statute was unconstitutional 
because it required a sentencing judge to assess the nature, 
                                              
 4 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489–90 (Scalia, Thomas, 
Ginsburg, JJ., joining the majority) (“[I]t is arguable that 
Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided, and that a logical 
application of our reasoning today should apply if the 
recidivist issue were contested.”); id. at 520–21 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“[O]ne of the chief errors of Almendarez-
Torres—an error to which I succumbed—was to attempt to 
discern whether a particular fact is traditionally (or typically) 
a basis for a sentencing court to increase an offender’s 
sentence. . . . [T]his approach just defines away the real 
issue.”). 
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rather than the mere fact of, predicate felony convictions 
before imposing a PFO sentence.  They urged the court to 
construe the Almendarez-Torres exception to Apprendi 
narrowly so as to prevent a sentencing judge from considering 
the facts underlying a defendant’s prior conviction when 
forming an opinion about his criminal history.  Finding “no 
clear holding of the Supreme Court to command such a 
result,” the Second Circuit explained that, “‘[g]iven the lack 
of holdings from th[e] [Supreme Court]’ construing the 
recidivism exception as narrowly as petitioners urge, ‘it 
cannot be said that the state court unreasonably applied 
clearly established federal law.’”  Id. at 92 (quoting Carey v. 
Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006)).  Commenting on the “lack 
of guidance as to the precise scope of the recidivism 
exception,” the court concluded: 
It might well be constitutionally significant 
whether a sentencing judge is required to find, 
for example, that a defendant’s criminal history 
is “especially violent” before imposing a 
sentence, or whether, as in New York, a 
sentencing judge simply must find that the 
nature of his criminal history justifies “extended 
incarceration and life-time supervision.” . . . 
The Supreme Court may answer that question at 
some future time.  But, if our Court cannot 
divine a clear answer from the Court’s existing 
holdings, AEDPA prevents us from faulting a 
state court for selecting one reasonable 
conclusion over another. 
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Id. at 93; see also United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 148 
(2d Cir. 2006) (noting that while the continued viability of 
Almendarez-Torres has been questioned, the Supreme Court 
has not reversed that decision). 
 The Eighth Circuit reached a similar result in Davis.  
There, the appellant had been sentenced to a term of life 
imprisonment as a repeat offender following a federal 
conviction for attempted armed bank robbery, an offense that 
carried a statutory maximum of twenty-five years.  He argued 
that the question of whether his past robbery convictions were 
qualifying felonies for purposes of the recidivist statute 
should have been decided by the jury, not by the sentencing 
judge.  The court disagreed, finding that the “fact of prior 
conviction includes not only the fact that a prior conviction 
exists, but also a determination of whether a conviction is one 
of the enumerated types qualifying for the sentence 
enhancement.”  Davis, 260 F.3d at 969.  Conceding that 
Apprendi casts doubt on the viability of Almendarez-Torres, 
the Eighth Circuit nonetheless concluded that its role was “to 
apply Supreme Court precedent as it stands, and not as it may 
develop.”  Id. 
Adverse to the Second Circuit’s decision in Portalatin 
and the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Davis stands the opinion 
of the Ninth Circuit in Wilson v. Knowles, 638 F.3d 1213 (9th 
Cir. 2011).  After a 1993 car accident, Wilson pleaded no 
contest to gross vehicular manslaughter while driving under 
the influence of alcohol and to proximately causing bodily 
injury while driving under the influence of alcohol.  When 
sentencing Wilson for a separate 2000 conviction for driving 
under the influence with a prior felony, a California judge 
relied on the information and preliminary hearing transcripts 
from Wilson’s 1993 convictions to find numerous additional 
12 
 
facts about the earlier offenses, including that Wilson 
personally inflicted bodily injury, that the bodily injury was 
great, and that his victim was not an accomplice.  These 
factual findings led the judge to conclude that Wilson’s 1993 
convictions qualified as two predicate offenses for purposes 
of California’s Three Strikes Law, and Wilson received an 
enhanced sentence of 25-years to life. 
The Ninth Circuit held that the state court’s factfinding 
was an unreasonable application of Apprendi.  See id. at 1215 
(“It would be unreasonable to read Apprendi as allowing a 
sentencing judge to find the kinds of disputed facts at issue 
here. . . . The judge’s fact-finding seven years after the 1993 
conviction extended beyond any reasonable interpretation of 
the prior conviction exception.”).  Chief Judge Kozinski 
dissented, stating: “The Supreme Court hasn’t straightened all 
this out. . . . AEDPA deference can be a bitter pill to swallow.  
In some habeas cases, we must reject what appear to be valid 
constitutional claims because petitioner’s rights have not yet 
been clearly established by the Supreme Court.”  Id. at 1217 
(Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
Although it is possible that Wilson was correctly 
decided while Portalatin, Davis, and Chief Judge Kozinski’s 
dissent in Wilson were all in error, it is immaterial for 
AEDPA purposes which line of analysis is correct.  The mere 
fact of a difference of opinion among courts of appeals leads 
ineluctably to the conclusion that a state court cannot run 
afoul of AEDPA regardless of which of these two paths it 
chooses. 
 Stated differently, I am loath to conclude that the 
United States Court of Appeals judges who decided 
Portalatin and Davis are not “fairminded.”  Yarborough, 541 
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U.S. at 664.  Indeed, the intersection of criminal procedure 
and constitutional law often presents difficult questions upon 
which reasonable minds can differ.5
                                              
 5 See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 
305 (2009) (5-4 decision); Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 (5-4 
decision); Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224 (5-4 decision). 
  And while it is true that 
no Supreme Court decision explicitly authorized the state 
judge to delve into Garrus’s prior conviction, the fact that no 
decision of the Court prohibited her from doing so is 
dispositive under AEDPA.  Unless and until the Supreme 
Court overrules or modifies Almendarez-Torres, state courts 
cannot properly be held to have violated the Constitution 
when they find facts at sentencing to determine whether a 
recidivist statute applies.  For that reason, I respectfully 
dissent. 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge, dissenting, joined by 
CHAGARES, HARDIMAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
 Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Congress vested the Supreme 
Court — and only the Supreme Court — with the authority to 
determine clearly established law for purposes of analyzing 
an inmate‟s federal challenge to a state court judgment.  
Today, the majority feigns fidelity to this enduring tenet of 
AEDPA jurisprudence.  In the process, the majority assumes 
the role of legislator, rewriting AEDPA to add this Court, 
along with the Supreme Court, as the two judicial bodies 
capable of delineating clearly established law.  Armed with 
this newly created authority, the majority wades through 
murky Supreme Court precedent and emerges with what it 
purports to be an unassailable legal principle:  that the prior-
conviction exception enshrined in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466 (2000), forbids a sentencing court from finding 
facts inconsistent with a prior conviction when applying a 
state recidivism statute.  
 Unlike the majority, I cannot discern any principle in 
Apprendi or other authoritative Supreme Court precedent that 
would render this interpretation of the prior-conviction 
exception objectively unreasonable, the deferential standard 
by which we must judge the state court‟s determination.  
Indeed, the majority identifies not one Supreme Court case 
expounding on the contours of the amorphous prior-
conviction exception.  This lack of clarity coupled with the 
inherent tension between Apprendi and Almendarez-Torres v. 
United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) — a controlling case the 
majority brushes aside as having limited relevance — belies 
2 
 
the majority‟s triumphant conclusion that the state court‟s 
determination was objectively unreasonable.   
 I do not disagree that the majority‟s interpretation of 
the prior-conviction exception is a reasonable and even 
favorable one, preventing an otherwise seemingly inequitable 
result.  Of course, our task is not to simply choose the 
preferred reading of an ambiguous legal phrase.  Absent 
guidance from the Supreme Court, we are left to determine 
whether the state court‟s interpretation was objectively 
unreasonable.  Given that this area of law is, at best, in a state 
of flux, AEDPA “demands that [the] state-court decision[] be 
given the benefit of the doubt.”  Renico v. Lett, --- U.S. ---, 
---, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  For this reason, I am compelled to 
respectfully dissent. 
I. AEDPA Imposes a High Threshold 
 While the majority outlines the basic AEDPA 
framework governing our inquiry, AEDPA‟s prominent role 
in this case requires further elaboration. 
 As amended by AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides, 
in pertinent part: “[A] circuit judge . . . shall entertain an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the 
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or 
laws or treaties of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).  
“[W]ith respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 
merits in State court proceedings,” the writ shall not issue 
unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision 
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
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Supreme Court of the United States” or was “based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”  Id. § 
2254(d)(1)-(2). 
 A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court 
precedent “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the 
governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,” or “if the 
state court confronts a set of facts that are materially 
indistinguishable from a decision of th[e] Court and 
nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court‟s] 
precedent.”  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000).  
A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of 
federal law “if the state court identifies the correct governing 
legal rule from [the Supreme] Court‟s cases but unreasonably 
applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner‟s case.”  
Id. at 407.  To qualify as an “unreasonable application” of 
clearly established federal law, the state court‟s application 
must be objectively unreasonable.  Id. at 409.  That the state 
court decision was incorrect or erroneous is insufficient if the 
error was nonetheless objectively reasonable.  Id. at 410; see 
also Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1862 (“[A]n unreasonable 
application of federal law is different from an incorrect 
application of federal law.” (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 
410)).  “Indeed, „a federal habeas court may not issue the writ 
simply because that court concludes in its independent 
judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 
established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.‟”  Renico, 
130 S. Ct. at 1862 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 411).   
 As a result, the “contrary” and “unreasonable 
application” thresholds are “highly deferential . . . for 
evaluating state-court rulings, which demand[] that state-court 
decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”  Cullen v. 
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Pinholster, --- U.S. ---, ---, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) 
(quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per 
curiam)).  These standards are “„difficult to meet,‟ because 
the purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief 
functions as a „guard against extreme malfunctions in the 
state criminal justice systems,‟ and not as a means of error 
correction.”  Greene v. Fisher, --- U.S. ---, ---, 132 S. Ct. 38, 
43 (2011) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, --- U.S. ---, ---, 131 
S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011)). 
 I agree with the majority that the focus of our inquiry 
is on the “unreasonable” prong because the state court 
identified controlling Supreme Court precedent.  See 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 406 (“[A] run-of-the-mill state-court 
decision applying the correct legal rule from our cases to the 
facts of a prisoner‟s case would not fit comfortably within § 
2254(d)(1)‟s „contrary to‟ clause.”).  As such, we can grant 
Garrus‟s petition only if the sentencing court‟s application of 
Pennsylvania‟s recidivism statute transcended the bounds of 
this undeniably deferential framework. 
II. Majority’s Discussion of Supreme Court  
Precedent Falls Short 
 It is undeniable that the majority‟s interpretation of 
Apprendi‟s prior-conviction exception cannot stand in the 
absence of clearly established law.  See Howes v. Fields, --- 
U.S. ---, ---, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1187 (2012) (rejecting a circuit 
court‟s determination that Supreme Court precedent clearly 
established a categorical rule regarding custodial 
interrogations of inmates).  Recognizing its obligation, the 
majority spends pages examining Supreme Court precedent.  
Yet nowhere in that examination does the majority grapple 
with precedent that undermines its position.  This principled 
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avoidance is the only means by which the majority can reach 
the conclusion that Supreme Court precedent clearly 
establishes that it would be objectively unreasonable to 
interpret the phrase “the fact of a prior conviction” as the state 
court did in this case. 
 I do not disagree with the majority that Apprendi is at 
the forefront of our inquiry.  I do disagree, however, with the 
majority‟s perception that Apprendi is the be-all and end-all 
of our inquiry.  The majority‟s singular focus is apparent at 
the beginning of its opinion, stating that the “[k]ey” to 
resolving this case involves answering “whether, pursuant to 
AEDPA, the state court unreasonably applied Apprendi.”  
(Majority Op. at 3.)  However, as the majority acknowledges, 
Garrus was sentenced under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9714, 
Pennsylvania‟s recidivism statute.  Despite this admission, 
Almendarez-Torres — a critical Supreme Court case 
examining a sentencing court‟s power to engage in 
factfinding when applying a recidivism statute — plays 
second fiddle to Apprendi in the majority‟s opinion.  And 
when the majority does address Almendarez-Torres, it 
sidesteps the very logic in Almendarez-Torres that casts even 
the slightest doubt on the notion that the majority‟s 
interpretation of the prior-conviction exception is clearly 
established.    
 Almendarez-Torres involved a federal statute that 
permitted an enhanced penalty for any person unlawfully in 
the United States who had previously been deported after 
being convicted of an aggravated felony.  523 U.S. at 226.  
The defendant pled guilty to being in the United States, 
without permission, after being deported.  Id.  At sentencing, 
the defendant argued that the enhancement should not apply 
because his three previous convictions for aggravated 
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felonies, which the defendant did not contest, were not 
charged in the current indictment.  Id. at 227.  The district 
court rejected this argument, found the existence of the prior 
convictions, and applied the sentence enhancement.  Id.  The 
Fifth Circuit affirmed.  Id. at 227-28.   
 The Supreme Court held that the district court properly 
treated the defendant‟s prior convictions as a sentencing 
factor and not a separate offense.  Id. at 235.  The Court 
repeatedly stressed that its analysis was predicated on the 
unique role recidivism plays at sentencing.  See id. (“At the 
outset, we note that the relevant statutory subject matter is 
recidivism.  That subject matter — prior commission of a 
serious crime — is as typical a sentencing factor as one might 
imagine.”); id. (“With recidivism as the subject matter in 
mind . . . .”); id. at 241 (“[The statute at issue] involves one of 
the most frequently found factors that affects sentencing —
recidivism.”); id. at 243 (“[T]he sentencing factor at issue 
here — recidivism — is a traditional, if not the most 
traditional, basis for a sentencing court‟s increasing an 
offender‟s sentence.”).  The Court noted that, historically, 
recidivism operated outside of the general framework 
requiring elements of an offense be submitted to a jury 
because “recidivism „does not relate to the commission of the 
offense, but goes to the punishment only, and therefore . . . 
may be subsequently decided.‟”  Id. (quoting Graham v. West 
Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 624 (1912)). 
 Two years after Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme 
Court rendered a decision in what we have described as its 
“seminal case” on sentencing — Apprendi.  Reinhold v. 
Rozum, 604 F.3d 149, 152 (3d Cir. 2010).  In Apprendi, the 
defendant received an enhanced sentence of twelve years for 
weapon offenses punishable by a statutory maximum of ten 
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years, based on a determination by the sentencing court, not 
the jury, that the crime was racially motivated.  530 U.S. at 
470-71.  Rejecting this approach, the Court pronounced that 
the Sixth Amendment required that “[o]ther than the fact of a 
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a 
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
Id. at 490.  Central to the Court‟s determination was the fact 
that the hate crime enhancement required a finding that the 
defendant‟s purpose was to intimidate on the basis of race —
an inquiry into the defendant‟s mens rea, an element of the 
offense.  Id. at 492-93. 
 The Court attempted to dispel any apparent tension 
between the rule announced in Apprendi and the Court‟s 
decision in Almendarez-Torres.  “Whereas recidivism „does 
not relate to the commission of the offense‟ itself, New 
Jersey‟s biased purpose inquiry goes precisely to what 
happened in the „commission of the offense.‟”  Id. at 496 
(quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 230).  But the Court 
was cognizant that “it is arguable that Almendarez-Torres was 
incorrectly decided” based on a “logical application” of the 
Court‟s analysis in Apprendi.  Id. at 489.  In the end, the 
Court reasoned that Almendarez-Torres “represents at best an 
exceptional departure” from Apprendi.  Id. at 487.  While the 
Apprendi Court provided less than unbridled support for 
Almendarez-Torres, it is clear that Almendarez-Torres had 
continuing vitality after Apprendi. 
 The majority devotes no attention to the integral role 
recidivism played in Almendarez-Torres, instead trying to 
minimize Almendarez-Torres‟s significance entirely.  
Quoting Apprendi, the majority refers to Almendarez-Torres 
as having “limited” and “narrow” application.  (Majority Op. 
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at 15 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488 n.14, 489).)  Put in 
its proper light, however, this characterization in no way 
subverts the importance of Almendarez-Torres to Garrus‟s 
case.   
 Apprendi did not involve the application of a 
recidivism statute.  Instead, Apprendi addressed a hate crime 
enhancement that inquired as to the defendant‟s mens rea, 
which the Court iterated was “as close as one might hope to 
come to a core criminal offense „element.‟”  530 U.S. at 493.  
By contrast, Almendarez-Torres expressly excluded 
recidivism as an exception to the nascent legal principle 
enshrined three years later in Apprendi.  Almendarez-Torres, 
523 U.S. at 244 (“[T]o hold that the Constitution requires that 
recidivism be deemed an „element‟ of petitioner‟s offense 
would mark an abrupt departure from a longstanding tradition 
of treating recidivism as going to the punishment only.”  
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).  As a result, 
it is unsurprising that Apprendi ensured that Almendarez-
Torres did not apply outside the recidivism context.  
However, recidivism is squarely at issue in this case, belying 
the majority‟s attempt to minimize Almendarez-Torres‟s 
relevance. 
 As much as the majority would like to forget 
Almendarez-Torres, there is little debate that Almendarez-
Torres remains binding precedent.  After Apprendi cast doubt 
on the continuing vitality of Almendarez-Torres, we 
addressed whether Almendarez-Torres‟s viability had been 
short-lived.  Because the Apprendi Court expressly declined 
to overrule Almendarez-Torres, we unsurprisingly applied 
Almendarez-Torres and held that predicate offenses under a 
recidivism statute need not be charged in an indictment and 
submitted to the jury.  See United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 
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231, 250 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Recently, in Apprendi[], the Court 
upheld the validity of Almendarez-Torres . . . .”).  We have 
since reaffirmed the viability of Almendarez-Torres and have 
not retreated from this determination.  United States v. 
Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d 142, 157 n.15 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(“Although several Supreme Court decisions have cast doubt 
on the statute‟s continuing constitutional viability post-
Apprendi, . . . we are bound by Almendarez-Torres . . . .”); 
United States v. Ordaz, 398 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(“The holding in Almendarez-Torres remains binding 
law . . . .”).1  The Supreme Court continues to recognize the 
separate treatment afforded prior convictions in Almendarez-
Torres.  See United States v. O’Brien, --- U.S. ---, ---, 130 S. 
Ct. 2169, 2174 (2010).   
                                              
1
 Every other circuit court to have considered the issue has 
agreed that Almendarez-Torres remains good law.  See United 
States v. Gonzalez, 682 F.3d 201, 204 (2d Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Salazar, 682 F.3d 953, 958 n.2 (11th Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Farrell, 672 F.3d 27, 37 n.12 (1st Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Nigg, 667 F.3d 929, 935-36 (7th Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Ruiz-Apolonio, 657 F.3d 907, 921 (9th Cir. 
2011); United States v. McMurray, 653 F.3d 367, 371 (6th 
Cir. 2011); United States v. Beckstrom, 647 F.3d 1012, 1020 
(10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Smith, 640 F.3d 358, 369 
(D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v. Olalde-Hernandez, 630 
F.3d 372, 377 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Mason, 628 
F.3d 123, 134 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Alston, 625 
F.3d 397, 406 (8th Cir. 2010). 
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III. State Court’s Determination Was Objectively 
Reasonable 
 Against this proper legal backdrop, there can be no 
doubt that, for purposes of sentencing under Pennsylvania‟s 
recidivism statute, the state court‟s determination that 
Garrus‟s second-degree burglary conviction could be treated 
as a first-degree offense was not objectively unreasonable.  
Almendarez-Torres established that a sentencing court 
applying a recidivism statute that carries with it a sentence 
above the statutory maximum is permitted to engage in 
judicial factfinding regarding the defendant‟s prior 
convictions.  In Apprendi, the Court clarified that such 
judicial factfinding was impermissible, except that relating to 
“the fact of a prior conviction.”  530 U.S. at 490.  In other 
words, the exact undefined judicial factfinding permitted by 
Almendarez-Torres.   
 Apprendi provides no guidance regarding the scope or 
meaning of the prior-conviction exception.  For good reason, 
Apprendi‟s true import is not the establishment of the 
exception to the rule but the rule itself — that a judge cannot 
find facts regarding an element of the offense where the 
defendant faces a sentence above the statutory maximum.  
Apprendi did not need to expound on the scope of the prior-
conviction exception because Apprendi was not, contrary to 
Almendarez-Torres, a recidivism case.  The prior-conviction 
exception remains as amorphous and undefined as the day 
Apprendi was decided.  See Kessee v. Mendoza-Powers, 574 
F.3d 675, 676 (9th Cir. 2009) (“What is the scope of the 
„prior conviction‟ exception to the general rule that a 
sentencing judge may not make factual findings that increase 
the statutory maximum criminal penalty?  The Supreme Court 
has not yet answered that question.”). 
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 I do not deny that the majority‟s reading of the prior-
conviction exception — prohibiting a sentencing court from 
applying a recidivism statute and finding a fact inconsistent 
with a prior conviction — is a reasonable interpretation.2  
Under AEDPA, that the majority‟s reading was reasonable 
does not ipso facto render all other readings patently 
unreasonable.  See id. (noting that, under AEDPA, just 
because an appellate court‟s own interpretation of the prior-
conviction exception is reasonable does not mean that the 
state court‟s reading was unreasonable).  “Because AEDPA 
authorizes federal courts to grant relief only when state courts 
act unreasonably, it follows that „the more general the rule‟ at 
issue — and thus the greater the potential for reasoned 
disagreement among fair-minded judges — „the more leeway 
state courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case 
determinations.”  Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1864 (quoting 
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).  In my 
view, the prior-conviction exception is sufficiently general 
and undefined, such that we must, under AEDPA, defer to the 
                                              
2
 I concede that the state court‟s decision in this case 
produced a seemingly inequitable result.  We have recognized 
that a guilty plea binds a defendant “to the accuracy of the 
facts set forth in the indictment.”  United States v. Parker, 
874 F.2d 174, 177 n.1 (3d Cir. 1989).  The state court‟s 
determination would appear to run counter to this principle 
because Garrus was not held to the facts he pled to as part of 
the judicial process related to his 1997 burglary conviction.  
However, Almendarez-Torres simply treats recidivism 
differently.  While there is no doubt that the majority‟s moral 
compass is well-aligned, morality cannot trump our duty to 
faithfully apply Supreme Court precedent.   
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state court.  Given the logic of Almendarez-Torres and the 
fact that the Supreme Court has yet to clarify the scope of the 
prior-conviction exception, I simply cannot subscribe to the 
majority‟s finding that the state court‟s decision here was 
objectively unreasonable. 
 A few additional points bear mentioning.  First, the 
majority opinion suffers from an internal inconsistency.  
Relying as it does on Apprendi, a case founded on the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial, one would expect the 
majority to require that a jury determine whether or not 
Garrus‟s prior conviction for burglary qualifies as a crime of 
violence.  Yet the majority does the opposite, requiring that 
the judge determine that Garrus‟s prior conviction was 
necessarily not a crime of violence. 
 Second, the majority notes that “[n]o existing 
precedent so much as hints that [the state court‟s] paradoxical 
interpretation of Apprendi might be reasonable.”  (Majority 
Op. at 20.)  This point suffers from two flaws.  One could 
easily reverse the logic of this statement and assert that no 
Supreme Court precedent suggests that the majority‟s 
interpretation is the only reasonable interpretation.  Under 
AEDPA, that is sufficient to uphold the state court‟s 
determination.   
 More importantly, the proposition is simply inaccurate.  
The majority makes clear that it is troubled by the fact that 
Garrus pled guilty to second degree burglary only to have a 
judge find facts years later inconsistent with that prior 
conviction and without affording Garrus procedural 
safeguards.  In United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151 (2d 
Cir. 2001), then-Judge Sotomayor, writing for the court, 
addressed whether the requirement under the federal 
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recidivism statute, the Armed Career Criminal Act, that the 
defendant have three predicate convictions “committed on 
occasions different from one another,” is a factual issue that 
must be submitted to a jury under Apprendi.  Id. at 152.  In 
resolving the issue in the negative, Judge Sotomayor stressed 
that courts make determinations all the time in the context of 
recidivism for which the Apprendi procedural safeguards do 
not attach.  See id. at 156 (“The determination of „the fact of a 
prior conviction‟ implicitly entails many subsidiary findings, 
not the least of which is that the defendant being sentenced is 
the same defendant who previously was convicted of those 
prior offenses, a fact that could be quite controversial indeed.  
Determination of this question would not necessarily come 
with the „procedural safeguards‟ noted in Apprendi.”).  Judge 
Sotomayor went on to conclude: 
In short, we read Apprendi as 
leaving to the judge, consistent 
with due process, the task of 
finding not only the mere fact of 
previous convictions but other 
related issues as well.  Judges 
frequently must make factual 
determinations for sentencing, so 
it is hardly anomalous to require 
that they also determine the „who, 
what, when, and where‟ of a prior 
conviction. 
 
Id.  Santiago refutes the majority‟s unyielding interpretation 
of the phrase “the fact of a prior conviction,” which is even 
more meaningful considering that Santiago was not a case 
decided under the highly deferential AEDPA framework. 
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 Finally, there is little doubt that Almendarez-Torres‟s 
continuing vitality is in jeopardy.  See Shepard v. United 
States, 544 U.S. 13, 27-28 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“Almendarez-Torres . . . has been eroded by this Court‟s 
subsequent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and a majority 
of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was 
wrongly decided. . . . [I]n an appropriate case, this Court 
should consider Almendarez-Torres‟ continuing viability.”).  
However, we must apply Almendarez-Torres until the 
Supreme Court holds otherwise.  See Hohn v. United States, 
524 U.S. 236, 252-53 (1998) (“Our decisions remain binding 
precedent until we see fit to reconsider them, regardless of 
whether subsequent cases have raised doubts about their 
continuing vitality.”); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. 
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a precedent of 
this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest 
on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court 
of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, 
leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own 
decisions.”). 
 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.   
 
